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
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## Movements in Times of Democratic Transition

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## Mobilizing for Democracy

### *Social Movements in Democratization Processes*

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Even though social movements are more and more recognized, in political and academic debates, as important actors in democracies, interactions between politics and the social sciences have been rare (Rossi and della Porta 2009; della Porta 2014). Social movements have been far from prominent in the literature on democratization, which has mainly focused instead on economic preconditions, elites' behavior, or the geopolitical situation. Modernization theory and the historical class perspective are structural approaches, especially concerned with the preconditions for democracy. They recognize the central role of economic conditions and social classes but disregard the specific role of social movements and contentious politics. The so-called developmental approach after World War II recommended economic supports as a precondition to political democratization. Transitology conceives of democratization as a transactional process among elites; although it presents a more dynamic perspective of democratization, it assigns a limited role to movements, unions, and protest. Most political science approaches privilege parties as main actors in the consolidation of democracy. Even the more dynamic approaches to democratization point to a declining degree of "participation from below" after the first phase of transition and, especially, during the so-called consolidation phase. Similarly, until recently, social movement scholars have paid only limited attention to democratization processes, mostly focusing on established democratic countries, especially the Western European and North American experiences. However, three recent trends brought potential for bridging research on social movements and that on democratization. First, in social movement research, the emergence of the global justice movement pushed social movement scholars to pay more attention to issues of democracy and to the social movements in the

Global South. At the same time, the global justice movements have addressed issues of democratization of more and more powerful international governmental organizations, as well as a “radical democratization” of already-democratic countries faced with the emerging challenges of representative democracy (Avritzer 2009; Baiocchi 2005; Sintomer, Herzeberg, and Roecke 2008). Second, the emergence of transnational advocacy coalitions on human rights and democracy has also been analyzed in research on democratization (in particular, in Latin America; see Brito 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Third, research on the wave of democratization in Eastern Europe since 1989 has started to emphasize the democratizing role of civil society—theoretically located between the state and the market—with a diminishing confidence in political parties as carriers of the democratization process. In some of these interpretations, civil society is conceptualized almost as synonymous for social movements (Cohen and Arato 1992; Kaldor 2003). Within this frame, several programs of civil society promotion have been sponsored by international governmental organizations and individual states (Beichel et al. 2014).

In what follows, we review these different perspectives and then propose an analytic organization of the different roles that social movements, trade unions, advocacy networks, churches, and cycles of protest play in the *dynamic*, *contingent*, and *contentious* shaping of democracy. In doing this, we are of course not pleading for an exclusive focus on democratization from below; we are convinced that the path and speed of democratization processes are influenced by the strength and characteristics of several social and political actors. The combination of protest and consensus is, in fact, a main challenge for democratization processes. We suggest, however, that social movements are often important actors in all stages of democratization. In our discussion of these topics, we draw examples especially from Latin America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe.

## **The Marginal Concern with Social Movements in Research on Democratization**

Studies on democratization have traditionally assigned a limited role to social movements and protest. This is true, although to different extent, within the main approaches to democratization, including structural approaches (modernization theory and the historical class perspective) and the elite transactional process approach (transitology).

### *Structuralist Approaches to Democratization*

The first studies of democratization emerged in the aftermath of the massive destruction produced in Europe by World War II and in the reconfiguration of world politics mainly caused by the expansion of the Soviet Union’s area of

influence and the decolonization of Africa and Asia. Two predominantly structural perspectives developed with the intention of explaining political regime change in peripheral countries (democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian). Research mainly focused on the prerequisites necessary for democracy to emerge and survive and on discovering which social class is the key actor in promoting and sustaining a democratic regime.

Within modernization theory, S. M. Lipset's (1959) pioneering work associated the chance for emergence of a democratic regime with economic development. This approach tended to recommend economic supports (such as the Marshall Plan) as a precondition to political democratization and accordingly considered the emergence of democracy in low-income countries improbable and its survival precarious. Sustainable democracy requires structural prerequisites, among them the development of a prodemocratic middle class. Even if studies with large samples have often confirmed a positive and statistically significant correlation between gross domestic product and the presence of democratic institutions,<sup>1</sup> that does not account for agency and thus cannot explain why poorer countries, such as Portugal (1974), Greece (1974), Ecuador (1979), Peru (1980), and Bolivia (1982), democratized before more industrialized countries such as Argentina (1983), Brazil (1985–1990), Chile (1991), and South Korea (1987–1988).<sup>2</sup>

Although powerful in explaining the survival of already-established democracies, modernization theory tends to ignore the role of social actors (social movements among them) in *crafting* democracy and therefore cannot explain the different tempos (i.e., whether decadelong or abrupt transitions) and democratization quality (i.e., whether procedural or substantive democracy) among them. As we argue later, incorporating social movement literature into the study of democratization processes can help bring agency back in.

The most prominent modernization scholar, Samuel Huntington (1965, 1991), rejects mobilization (in particular of the working class) as a source of democratization from below, defining those with high levels of mobilization as “praetorian societies.”<sup>3</sup> In his view, the potential for disruption produced by claims for inclusion needs to be limited and controlled, because the assumption is that democracy needs low levels of mobilization and unionization and that even these low levels can be allowed only after a relatively high level of industrialization has been achieved.

Several authors from diverse analytic traditions—for example, N. Bermeo (1997), R. B. Collier (1999), D. McAdam, S. Tarrow, and C. Tilly (2001), and Tilly (2004)—have instead convincingly demonstrated that mobilized actors play a crucial role in the emergence of democracy and in its preservation or expansion. Especially within historical sociology, research singled out the role of the masses in the first and second waves of democratization and in resistance movements in the fall of authoritarian regimes at the end of World War II. A central question became: Which is the democratizing social class? Historical accounts of the first democratization processes in Europe point to the labor movement's

part in struggling for civil, political, and social rights. In this regard, Barrington Moore Jr. (1966), although agreeing on the importance of some socioeconomic conditions, stresses the importance of social classes in first democratizations<sup>4</sup> in England (1642–1649), France (1789–1848), and the United States (1861–1865). Similarly, R. Bendix (1964) looks at how the masses entered history during the first European democratization wave; T. H. Marshall (1992) stresses popular mobilization in the struggle for civil, political, and social rights; A. Pizzorno (1996) observes that the socialist and other movements were important in the development of liberal democracy; and Tilly (2007) points to the nationalization and autonomization of protest activities during state and market building.

Moore's hypotheses on the impact of class structures on democratization processes have been cited by scholars looking at the role of different classes in more recent waves of democratization. In pathbreaking work, D. Rueschemeyer, E. H. Stephens, and J. Stephens (1992) found that—given a certain level of economic development—the working class has been the key actor promoting democratization in the last two waves of democratization in Southern Europe, South America, and the Caribbean.<sup>5</sup> More recently, in another cross-national comparison, Collier (1999) suggests that the working class—although not so important in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century transitions in Western Europe as suggested by Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens—was crucial to the most recent wave of democratization in Southern Europe and South America. Beyond workers' role, C. Boix (2003) and D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson (2006: 38–39), using game theory, argue that democratization is successful when the middle classes do not side with the privileged classes in blocking the working class's demand for political inclusion. And J. Markoff (1996) emphasizes women's movements demanding democratic rights in the first long wave of democratization, starting in the late eighteenth century.

### *Conjunctural Approaches to Democratization*

While the historical class perspective shows more concern for interactive historical paths than does classic modernization theory, both perspectives overlook the agency of contentious actors and the interactive mechanisms associated with democratization.<sup>6</sup> Agency is instead central in the so-called transitologist approach, which, however, did not pay much attention to social movements as potential actors in democratization.

After the 1970s wave of democratization in Southern Europe, political science approaches to the construction of political institutions have privileged political parties as main democratic actors (Higley and Gunther 1992). Even the more dynamic approaches to democratization (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz and Stepan 1996) tended to perceive the *reforma pactada-ruptura pactada* (negotiated reform–negotiated break) in Spain (1977) as the model for successful democratization. They stressed a demobilization of “mass politics” (or at least their channeling within institutionalized political parties) as necessary for

an effective consolidation of democracy. In the theoretical volume concluding their broad research project, G. O'Donnell and P. Schmitter (1986) dedicate a section to what they call the "resurrection of civil society," meaning the short disruptive moment when movements, unions, churches, and the society in general push for an initial transition of a nondemocratic regime toward democracy. Although this is a moment of great expectations,

regardless of its intensity and of the background from which it emerges, this popular upsurge is always ephemeral. Selective repression, manipulation, and cooptation by those still in control of the state apparatus, the fatigue induced by frequent demonstrations and "street theatre," the internal conflicts that are bound to emerge over choices about procedures and substantive policies, a sense of ethical disillusionment with the "realistic" compromises imposed by pact-making or by the emergence of oligarchic leadership within its component groups are all factors leading toward the dissolution of the upsurge. The surge and decline of the "people" leaves many dashed hopes and frustrated actors. (1986: 55–56)

The short time civil society is present in the streets is not only inevitable, given the rechanneling of participation through the political parties and the electoral system, but also desirable, to avoid frightening authoritarian softliners into abandoning the negotiation process with the prodemocracy moderates. Elites are thus not only the source of the democratization process but also the ones who control its outcome. If for O'Donnell and Schmitter contentious politics favors the transition of a nondemocratic regime to democracy, for the contributors to J. Higley and R. Gunther's volume (1992) any kind of social movement, protest, or strike must be controlled and demobilized to assure a consolidated procedural democracy. While in O'Donnell and Schmitter's view democratization is made possible by a division between (authoritarian and democratic) elites, in Higley and Gunther's analysis it is the consensus among negotiating elites that allows for consolidation. Transitology, thus, emphasizes the contingent and dynamic nature of the democratization process but tends to reduce it to a bargaining among political elites in a context of uncertainty.

Within transitology, more systematic attention to civil society in democratization processes can be found in J. Linz and A. Stepan's (1996) model of extended transition. They take into account not only the immediate liberalization and transition bargaining process but also the characteristics of the previous nondemocratic regime (i.e., authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, sultanistic), the way the nondemocratic elites exit state power, the historical characteristics of the political parties and the elites, and, when it ends, the uncertainty climate. "A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state[,] can help transitions get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy" and is necessary to complement the

“political society,” made of the elites and institutionalized actors. “At all stages of the democratization process, therefore, a lively and independent civil society is invaluable” (9). Even though recognizing its role in theory, the two authors do not give much empirical space to the analysis of civil society.

Reflecting on the relationship between the characteristics of the previous authoritarian regime and the chances for the emergence of prodemocratic mobilizations, Linz and Stepan (1996: chap. 3) suggest that, by eliminating any pluralism, totalitarian regimes jeopardize the development of autonomous organizations and networks that could then be the promoters of democracy. Sultanistic regimes, because of the high personalization of power, manipulate mobilization for ceremonial purposes and through para-state groups, discouraging and repressing any kind of autonomous organization that could sustain resistance networks. Authoritarian regimes, mainly those installed in countries with previous (semi)democratic familiarity, generally experience the most massive mobilizations and face some organized underground resistance based on several networks that either preexisted the regime or formed later, thanks to the higher degree of pluralism. Linz and Stepan add another ideal-typical regime, post-totalitarian, but this seems to be more an intermediate step in the democratization of totalitarian regimes than a regime type. Two subtypes of authoritarianism, not mentioned by these authors, are important for our purposes: (a) bureaucratic-authoritarianism, in which a technocratic civic-military elite commands the depoliticization of a mobilized society for capital accumulation (O’Donnell 1973), and (b) populist-authoritarianism, in which elites mobilize the society from above for legitimating the regime while incorporating the lower classes (see Hinnebusch 2007). While some South American and Southeast Asian countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.) were bureaucratic-authoritarian, the predominant model in some Middle Eastern and North African countries (Egypt, Algeria, etc.) was populist-authoritarian. Linz and Stepan hypothesize an interesting relationship between the type of nondemocratic regime and the potential for the emergence of movements, protests, strikes, and underground resistance networks that antedate liberalization and accompany democratization. Recent studies have shown the impact of the regime type on the characteristics of contentious politics (Almeida 2003; Ulfelder 2005; Ortiz 2013).

Linz and Stepan (1996: chap. 2) also stress the need to consider multiple simultaneous transitions (e.g., simple, with only regime change; dual, with a change in regime plus economic system; or triple, with change also in the nation-state arrangement). In this sense, it is important not only whether the previous regime was authoritarian or totalitarian but also whether it was capitalist or communist (Stark and Bruszt 1998). Additionally, in a triple transition, nation-state building is complicated when nationalist movements mobilize in the name of contending visions of which movement should be the demos of the future democracy. Thus, although in the Soviet Union in 1991 regional mobilization led to the dissolution of the political unit, in Spain it did not. Basque

and Catalan nationalist movements undermined the legitimacy of Francisco Franco's regime but were unsuccessful in achieving independence. Czechoslovakia, for instance, experienced a peaceful dissolution of the polity along with a democratic and capitalist transition in 1989–1992. These changes can be explained only through the intertwined role played by regime elites, democratic elites, mobilized groups, and international pressures. Moderation in claims for autonomy and independence has been mentioned as favoring the transition to democracy and radicalized claims as jeopardizing it (see, e.g., Reinares 1987; Oberschall 2000; Glenn 2003).

Even though the dynamic, agency-focused approach of transitology allowed some interest in the role played by movements in democratization to develop (see Pagnucco 1995), it did not focus attention on them. In addition to its elitist bias, some other assumptions of transitology have been criticized. First, transitologists tend to emphasize individuals over collectives, which reduces the process to strategic instrumental thinking, ignoring class-defined actors such as unions and labor and left-wing parties, and it is state-centric, which subordinates social actors to state actors (Collier and Mahoney 1997). Second, transitology tends to consider movements and protest actors as manipulated by elites and focusing on very instrumentally defined purposes (Baker 1999).<sup>7</sup> Third, while transitologists believed in the inevitability and desirability of “elitization” of the democratization process, research by social movement scholars proved the importance of the interplay between elites and mobilized social actors as the necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a democratization process, questioning the elite-led and elite-ended logic that previously dominated democratization studies. Scholars who have analyzed democratization in nonelitist perspectives generally agree that not even the Spanish transition model is a purely elite-controlled bargaining process. Massive strike waves, terrorist attacks by nationalist movements, and an ascending cycle of protest characterized the transition (see, e.g., Maravall 1978, 1982; Reinares 1987; Foweraker 1989; Tarrow 1995; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 171–186; Sánchez-Cuenca and Aguilar 2009), better defined as a destabilization and extrication process (Collier 1999: 126–132) or as “a cycle of protest intertwined with elite transaction” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 186). In sum, transitology is accused of ignoring the long-term, dynamic, contingent, and contentious process associated with the creation of the conditions for the breakdown of nondemocratic regimes. The next section addresses this process.

## **Perspectives of Democratization from Social Movement Studies**

With few exceptions (e.g., some Latin American scholars), the literature on social movements has traditionally shown little interest in democratization processes (della Porta and Diani 2006). Only recently the concept of contentious

politics, as opposed to routine politics, has been proposed to link research on phenomena such as social movements, revolutions, strike waves, nationalisms, and democratization (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

Moreover, even those who have accorded an importance to social movements disagree on the positive versus negative effects of their intervention. Charles Tilly singles out two opposed conceptions of social movements in the process of democratization. First, a “populist approach to democracy” emphasizes participation from below, where “social movements contribute to the creation of public space—social settings . . . in which consequential deliberation over public affairs take place—as well as sometimes contributing to transfers of power over states” (Tilly 1993–1994: 1). Second, an elitist approach believes that democratization must be a top-down process and that an excess of mobilization leads to new forms of authoritarianism since the elites fear changes that are too much too soon. In this sense, Tilly stresses that, although it is not always straightforward, one can see “a broad correspondence between democratization and social movements” (2004: 125). On the one hand, many of the processes that cause democratization also promote social movements, and “democratization as such further encourages people to form social movements” (131). On the other hand, “under some conditions and in a more limited way, social movements themselves promote democratization” (131).

If democratization promotes social movements via the broadening of citizens’ rights and the public accountability of ruling elites, many, but not all, social movements support democracy. Some movements refuse democracy altogether (as do fascist and neofascist ones), others might have the unwanted effect of producing backlash in democratic rights (as have some guerrilla movements in Latin America; see Wickham-Crowley 1992; Brockett 2005). Sometimes people mobilize against democratic regimes, demanding authoritarian solutions to political or economic crisis, providing the nondemocratic actors with a popular source of legitimacy (e.g., middle-class women’s protests against Salvador Allende’s government in Chile), and some actors seek restrictions of democratic rights in democratic regimes (e.g., European anti-immigration and xenophobic movements).<sup>8</sup> Identity politics, such as in ethnic conflicts, often led to religious war and racial violence (Eder 2003). In other cases, movements trying to promote democratization might have the perverse effect of increasing state repression or facilitating the emergence of undemocratic actors (e.g., the collapse of the Weimar Republic in Germany).

In most cases, however, a positive relation between social movements and the promotion of democracy can be found. By pushing for suffrage enlargement or the recognition of associational rights, many social movements contribute to democratization. As Edwin Amenta and Neal Caren summarize, “Gains in the democratization of state processes are perhaps the most important [gains] that social movements can influence and have the greatest systemic effects” (2004: 465). An incomplete but relevant correspondence between the processes that promote democratization and social movements has been explained this way:

“First, many of the same processes that cause democratization also independently promote social movements. Second, democratization as such further encourages people to form social movements. Third, under some conditions and in a more limited way social movements themselves promote democratization” (Tilly 2004: 131).

In sum, social movements contribute to democratization only under certain conditions. Collective mobilization frequently creates the conditions for a destabilization of authoritarian regimes, but it can also lead to an intensification of repression or the collapse of weak democratic regimes, particularly when social movements do not stick to democratic conceptions. Labor, student, and ethnic movements brought about a crisis in the Franco regime in Spain in the 1960s and 1970s, but the worker and peasant movements and the fascist counter-movements contributed to the failure of the process of democratization in Italy in the 1920s and 1930s (Tarrow 1995).

Because the relationship between social movements and democratization is not simple, the main question for social movement scholars has been when and how do movements promote democratization? Two branches in social movement studies have tried to answer this question: the new social movement approach and the political process one. We begin with a brief overview of both and then analyze the role of social movements in each stage of democratization.

In Europe the new social movement approach has looked at the emergence of a new actor in postindustrial society. Alain Touraine (1981), the most prominent exponent of this perspective, argues that the capital-labor conflict has been surpassed by new conflicts related to the self-representation of the society and the types of actions related to its transformation. Thus, the new conflicts developed outside the factory and the labor movements, and the claims for taking state power were abandoned by the women’s, student, and environmental movements of Western Europe. Although its original aim was to explain a very different phenomenon, some authors widely applied the new social movement approach in the 1980s–1990s Latin American transitions, emphasizing the cultural and social democratization produced by movements, decentering the state as their main interlocutor (Slater 1985; Jelin 1987; Escobar and Álvarez 1992), which is what ultimately caused these authors to ignore the elite-movement interaction as crucial for democratization (for example, see Arato 1981).

As interest in Latin American democratizations and the new social movement approach decreased, the political process approach became more prominent in studies of regime transformation as a result of the emergence of new democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Trying to elucidate what favors emergence of contention in liberal democracies, the political process approach devotes more systematic attention to the institutional context than the new social movement approach does, highlighting the interrelationship of governmental actors, political parties, social movements, and protest. Scholars taking this perspective have observed a curvilinear relationship between the emergence of protest and the openness of political opportunities

(Eisinger 1973). Recently, some have proposed the reformulation of transitology's perspective, accounting for contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Schock 2005; Tilly 2004).

Both approaches converge in suggesting that, if it is true that social movements are not necessarily promoters of democracy, neither does the elitist dynamic model fully explain democratization processes. Social movements play different roles in each specific stage of the democratization process. The rest of this chapter looks at social movements and contentious politics in the different stages of the democratization process (resistance, liberalization, transition, and expansion).

### *Resistance to Nondemocratic Regimes*

Democratization as a process starts much earlier than transitologists generally suggest. The elites begin a bargaining process because something happens that pushes some of them to withdraw their support from the nondemocratic regime. A trigger might be a prodemocratic cycle of protest and an increasingly massive and nonsyndical wave of strikes (see, e.g., Foweraker and Landman 1997; Collier 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). If "democratic transitions express a wide variety of trajectories and outcomes, it is suggested that 'the role of social movements within them is conditioned by the specific rhythm of the "protest cycle," the shape of the political opportunity structure, and the contingency of strategic choice'" (Foweraker 1995: 90n2). In Spain, Brazil, and Peru, for instance, strike waves were very important during part of the democratization process if not the entire process (Maravall 1982; Sandoval 1998; Collier 1999). So Peru's democratization process was very much influenced by a strike wave (1977–1980) against a highly unpopular authoritarian regime (Collier 1999: 115–119), and Brazil experienced a strike wave (1974–1979), followed by a cycle of protest (1978–1982) mainly mobilized by urban movements (Mainwaring 1987). If sometimes cycles of protest and strike waves converge, more often strike waves are stronger in the first resistance stages, decline later, and then reemerge during liberalization and transition in coordination with the upsurge of a cycle of protest originating from underground resistance networks.

Whatever the relevance of these contentious processes, most important in undermining the legitimacy of the regime and the (national and international) support for it are the underground networks of resistance. Latin American new social movement scholars (Jelin 1987; Corradi, Fagen, and Garretón 1992; Escobar and Álvarez 1992) studied the cultural and political resistance to the authoritarian regimes and the construction of alternative democratic networks. Human rights movements, trade unions, and churches often promote delegitimation of authoritarian regimes at international forums such as the United Nations and in clandestine or open resistance to an authoritarian regime at the national level. The resilience of resistance networks under repression is decisive at this stage, because these networks can lead to splits in the ruling authoritar-

ian or totalitarian elites and force even unwilling elites to initiate liberalization (Schock 2005). For instance, whereas the Catholic high hierarchy was often part of the elites that supported the authoritarian regime, in some countries church-related actors played a prodemocratic role.<sup>9</sup> So the Vicaría de la Solidaridad (Vicariate of Solidarity) in Chile condemned the repression, persecution, and assassinations ordered by Augusto Pinochet and helped coordinate the unions, parties, and grassroots activists that organized protests against the regime in the 1980s (Lowden 1996). In Brazil, with the incorporation of liberation theology, the church helped create grassroots empowering spaces through the Comunidades Eclesiais de Base (CEB; Christian-based Communities; see Burdick 1992; Levine and Mainwaring 2001). The CEB was central to the struggle for democratization, and Catholic groups worked as a broker in a prodemocratic coalition with the trade unions and urban movements. Similarly, in the Basque countries, the local clergy supported the opposition to the Francoist regime, helping preserve the Euskera language (della Porta and Mattina 1986). In Poland a prodemocratic alliance developed between the Catholic Church and Solidarność (Solidarity) union, which proved crucial in the network of resistance that helped create the necessary resources for the massive mobilizations during liberalization and transition (Glenn 2003; Osa 2003). And in Lithuania, the Catholic Church in cooperation with the Lithuanian diaspora in the United States and intellectuals in Russia were the main organizers of the resistance to Moscow's policies of sovietization (Lane 2001: 89–92).

In other countries, such as Argentina, the Catholic Church was a supportive bystander to state terrorism and in some cases even actively participated (Mignone 1988; Obregón 2005; Verbitsky 2005). Civic networks played delegitimizing roles: the Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo), Servicio de Paz y Justicia (Peace and Justice Service), and Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos (Permanent Assembly for Human Rights), among other organizations of the human rights movement, in coordination with human rights transnational advocacy networks initiated national and transnational campaigns for truth and justice to learn the fate of the thousands of disappeared—those kidnapped and killed by the military of Argentina (Brysk 1994; Wright 2007; Chapter 8). By naming and shaming, social movement organizations damage the image of authoritarian regimes in international forums such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States (Brysk 1993; Brito 1997; Sikkink 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998: chap. 3). Although authoritarian regimes are closed to political opposition, M. Keck and K. Sikkink have shown that a boomerang effect develops when human rights networks sensitize other countries and intergovernmental organizations to generate political pressure on an authoritarian regime:

Governments are the primary “guarantors” of rights, but also their primary violators. When government violates or refuses to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups often have no recourse within

domestic political and judicial arenas. They may seek international connections finally to express their concerns and even to protect their lives.

When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of international networks may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside. (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12)

Resistance to authoritarian regimes also developed inside (nonreligious) cultural groups. In the Czech Republic, for instance, the main organization in the democratization movement, the Civic Forum, emerged from the action of a network of artists and theaters constructing a space for autonomy and expression after strong state repression of student protests (Glenn 2003). Also in Asia and Africa, intellectuals and students often formed circles in which a critique of the regime developed (Parsa 2000).<sup>10</sup>

In particular, during the resistance stage, the labor movement and its allies may be effective promoters of democratic values and understandings that erode a nondemocratic regime and set the necessary conditions for liberalization to take place. Especially in Latin America and Southern Europe, workers' organizations but also other social movements have often developed strong ties with left-wing political organizations (Collier 1999). In a comparative study of women's movements in Southern European countries, D. della Porta, C. Valiente, and M. Kousis (forthcoming) stress the importance of women's organizations in the resistance against fascist regimes and the effect that their alliance had on the characteristics of the women's movement in those countries. The struggle against fascism represented, for instance, an important political experience for many Italian women: "If fascism . . . restricted women to a narrow, passive, limited existence as baby-makers, the antifascist democratic front created a new and active model for women" (Hellman 1987: 32–33). In 1943, the Gruppi di Difesa della Donna e di Assistenza ai Combattenti della Libertà (Groups for the Defense of Women and for Aid to the Volunteers for Liberty) were formed as part of the Resistance (Beckwith 1985: 22). These units, depending on the all-party Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (Committee for National Liberation), were in charge of food and weapon supply and assisted wounded partisans and partisans' families. Although only a few women of the seventy thousand or so who participated in the Resistance actually took up arms against fascism, their support role was essential. Similarly, feminism developed in authoritarian Spain mainly in a milieu of opposition to the dictatorship. Feminists were very active in general political and syndical clandestine work and in gender equality issues. In Greece, during the early 1960s, new organizing efforts led to the reemergence of a militant women's movement in the popular struggle for radical social change. The well-organized Pan-Hellenic Union of Greek Women was formed by women who were active participants of the national resistance

and members of the Greek Communist Party. A Coordinating Committee of Working Women was organized by communist and other progressive women.

Sometimes multisectoral coalitions were built to turn resistance into a liberalization process under control of the democratizing sectors. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Popular Fronts were the main coalitions in the struggle for independence from the USSR, and—as a by-product—for democratization. The Popular Fronts were coalitions of environmental and cultural social movement organizations, religious groups, the Catholic Church, neocommunist elites, and dissident groups organized by local intelligentsia profiting from Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost policies. They were later imitated in Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia, coordinating their actions for independence from the USSR (Beisinger 2002).

### *Liberalization and the Upsurge of Mobilization*

Democratization needs an acceleration of certain dynamics in order to occur. This acceleration spreads the perception among the authoritarian elites that there is no other way than to open the regime if they want to avoid civil war or violent takeover of power by democratic or revolutionary actors. This was the case, for instance, with the civic-military socialist revolution in Portugal in 1974 that started the transition to a democratic (although capitalist) regime and the protracted insurgency in El Salvador (1994) and in South Africa (1994) (Wood 2000). The intensity of the protests and strikes affected the elite choices of pursuing a long and controlled transition or a short extrication from state power.

During the liberalization stage, organized society becomes more visible: easing restrictions on meeting and demonstration rights develops in what has been called a “resurrection of civil society” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 26). During this stage movements may push toward effective democracy or resist the democratization process. Trade unions, labor/left-wing parties, and urban movements, mainly in shantytowns and industrial districts, have been presented as main actors seeking democracy (Slater 1985; Collier 1999; Silver 2003). In Chile, shantytown movements organized by members of the Communist Party in Santiago were among the main promoters of a 1983–1987 cycle of protest that pushed Augusto Pinochet to seek legitimacy through a referendum whose results triggered a controlled transition (Schneider 1992, 1995; Hipsher 1998). In Southern Europe women's organizations exercised pressure from below during the phases of liberalization, pushing regimes to open up. In fact, the few women's organizations that were tolerated by the authoritarian regimes provided the organizational resources for informal oppositional networks to develop. In particular, in Spain, during the wave of popular protest that accompanied the liberalization of Francoism, women took part in a sort of a resurrection of civil society. In the struggle against fascist regimes, some women's

organizations were influenced by the dominant frames that emphasized civil and political rights, participating in the common struggles for liberalization.

On some occasions, during phases of liberalization, boomerang effects are produced by social movement alliances with transnational actors. In Latin America and in Eastern Europe these alliances were crucial for the push from regime liberalization to an actual transition to procedural democracy (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Glenn 2003).

### *Transition to Procedural Democracy*

During the transition to democracy, social movements may push for social justice and the elimination of the reserved powers that limit the emerging democracy. Although political opportunities for mobilization open up because of the high uncertainty that characterizes this stage, cycles of protest may push in opposite directions. “Mobilization strengthens the ability of challengers and elites to make claims yet also limits the range of acceptable outcomes because of the conditional nature of popular support” (Glenn 2003: 104). Old (labor, ethnic) movements and new (women’s, urban) movements participate in large coalitions asking for democratic rights (Jelin 1987; Tarrow 1995; della Porta, Valiente, and Kousis, forthcoming; Chapter 10).

Often the transition stage is characterized by mobilization of a prodemocracy coalition of trade unions, political parties, churches, and social movements. Without this coalition democracy is usually not achieved because contending countermovements are likely to push for restoration of the authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Some right-wing or military networks might also resist transition or try to violently produce a democratic breakdown. This is exemplified by the Carapitanda (Face-painted) military group in Argentina in 1987, 1988, and 1990, which tried to end the trials of the military who had tortured and assassinated during the 1976–1983 authoritarian regime (Payne 2000: chap. 3). In other cases the reaction comes from the regime *nomenklatura* (those in positions of power in governmental, industrial, and other spheres, usually members of the Communist Party), with an increase in repression, as in the case of the 1989 crackdown on the Chinese student movement or the state of emergency against unions in Poland (Zhao 2000; Ekiert and Kubik 2001). In double transitions, we can also find protests and movements that resist the transformations of the economic system. This was the case of the 1989–1993 wave of farmers’ protest in Poland following promarket reforms (see Chapter 15).

The bargaining dynamic among elites and the increased radicalization of contention in the streets intensify the relationship between elites and movements (Casper and Taylor 1996: 9–10). J. Glenn (2003: 104) argues that the logic of the transition is manifold: (a) mobilizations affect elite negotiations by introducing new actors to the political arena, altering the power relationships among the contending parties, and inserting new demands into the process reshaping the course of action, and (b) elites’ negotiation affects mobilizations by itself

changing the degree of openness of the political opportunities for movements by modifying part of the claims and acceptable interlocutors of the process.

The moment at which the society is demobilized and politics is channeled into party politics is considered by transitologists as the end of the transition period. This outcome, however, is only one of many possible outcomes in actual transitions. Although demobilization did not occur after the transition in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Central America, in countries such as Uruguay and Chile politics was quickly institutionalized through the party system (Canel 1992; Schneider 1992; Hipsher 1998; Chapter 5; Chapter 7; Chapter 8). Latin America was not unique in this regard. For instance, in South Africa mobilization did not decrease after the transition (Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier 1998; Chapter 11), and the same is true in Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab Spring (della Porta 2014). Demobilization does not seem essential to consolidation, being instead linked to specific characteristics of the party system (Rossi 2006: 262). In general, continuous popular pressures after transition can be a major means for a successful consolidation (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005).

Certainly, social movement organizations mobilized during liberalization and transition do not totally disband. As soon as the institutions of representative democracy start to work, many activists dedicate themselves to building organizations capable of interacting with these institutions. In Southern Europe, women who had mobilized in the struggle for democracy participated in building new institutions. Even though the need to construct democratic institutions reduced the space for autonomous women's movements, women's groups emerged and reemerged. True, the very characteristics that had helped movements during liberalization and transition—an informal and flexible organizational structure, an emphasis on the society against the state, a focus on the unifying target of the struggle against the old regime—are likely to jeopardize their capacity to adapt to democratic politics. Social movements do not disappear, however. In Southern European countries, democratization helped a large number of women's organizations to flourish, even though they had different organizational structures, political and cultural aims, and propensity to use protest forms of action. In fact, the women's movements of the 1990s in Southern Europe were more similar than they had been in the 1980s to those in other Western democracies. In particular in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, the women's movements seem to have leap-frogged the radical phase that in other Western democracies has characterized the construction of a new feminist identity but are still ready to play a role in the consolidated democracies using routine as well as contentious forms of political participation.

The characteristics of the previous regime and the specific path of the transition seem to affect the ability of social movement organizations to adapt to democratization processes. Demobilization can be particularly difficult if democratic consolidation does not happen easily. This was the case in Portugal, complicated as it was by the involvement of the military and a mass insurgency that was not the expression of a strong and well-organized social movement

sector. To the contrary, as the analysis of the women's movement seems to indicate, a long-lasting authoritarian regime, with no previous experience with mass democracy and only a timid liberalization in the 1970s, had destroyed the organized society to the point that the democratic state had to actively intervene to build up civic associations (della Porta, Valiente, and Kousis, forthcoming). The reconstruction of civic participation seems to have been easier in Spain, where social movements had developed in the 1960s and 1970s that pushed for and took advantage of the liberalization of the regime. In Greece and Italy, with relatively shorter-lived authoritarian regimes, the nucleus of future social movement organizations was formed by the well-organized and armed Resistance, although in Italy the repression of the labor movement in the 1950s brought about a demobilization of social movements.

A tradition for mobilization and support for movements by political parties, unions, and religious institutions facilitate a high level of protest, as happened with the Communist Party promotion of shantytown dwellers' protests in Chile (Hipsher 1998; Schneider 1992, 1995); with the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT; Workers' Party) and part of the Roman Catholic Church support of the rural movements and unions in Brazil (Branford and Rocha 2002; Burdik 2004); and with the environmental movements in Eastern Europe (Koulov 1988; Beissinger 2002; Petrova 2004).

The role of social movement organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has been particularly stressed for the last wave of democratization. In particular, the transition in Eastern Europe beginning in the late 1980s brought about a new paradigm for the democratization of politics and policies: democracy needs a civically active collection of social organizations, preferably with some autonomy from the state. In recent democratization processes in Eastern Europe, the availability of public and private funds for NGOs contributed to an early institutionalization of movement organizations, showing that the weakness of civil society is often exaggerated (Flam 2001).

### *Consolidation of a Procedural (or Substantive?) Democracy*

In the political science literature, consolidation is generally defined as coming at the completion of the democratization process as signaled by the first free and open elections, the end of the uncertainty period, and/or the implementation of a minimum substantive democracy (O'Donnell 1993, 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996). Democracy, however, cannot be consolidated without the universal and effective application of citizenship rights, which transcend voting. At this stage, movements in many countries claim rights for those excluded by low-intensity democracies and ask for a more inclusive democracy (e.g., land reform, employment, and indigenous and women's rights) and the end of the authoritarian legacies (Eckstein 2001; Hite and Cesarini 2004; Rossi, forthcoming; della Porta, Valiente, and Kousis, forthcoming). Claims framed by movements in the name of rights, citizenship, and their political practices are crucial

in creating citizenry (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003). As Joe Foweraker observes, “The struggle for rights has more than a merely rhetorical impact. The insistence on the rights of free speech and assembly is a precondition of the kind of collective (and democratic) decision-making that educates citizens” (1995: 98). In brief, social movements usually produce long-term effects that are not only institutional but also cultural and social. These transformations are developed through the movements’ alternative practices and values that help sustain and expand democracy (Rossi 2005a; Santos 2005). Furthermore, movements’ networks are important in mobilizing against persistent exclusionary patterns and authoritarian legacies (Hagopian 1990; Yashar 2005; Chapter 8).

### *Expansion to Postrepresentative Democracy*

Finally, social movements may influence the expansion of democracy (a not-yet fully studied stage in democratization)<sup>11</sup> by addressing both democratic reform of the international system of governance and transcendence of representative democracy at the national level, through experiments of participatory and deliberative democracy (Baiocchi 2005; Santos 2005; della Porta 2013).<sup>12</sup>

The global civil society perspective (Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003) emphasizes the democratizing effect of a worldwide organized civil society (Cohen and Arato 1992) in democratization at a supranational scale. Moreover, research on global justice movements (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; della Porta 2009a, 2009b) and transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998) notes the role of human rights, indigenous, women’s and alter-globalization groups in the promotion and expansion of national democratic regimes and in the reformulation of the not-so-democratic procedures of international governmental organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the case of the global justice movements, proposals for reform are especially oriented toward a broader transparency of decision making in international governmental organizations, increased controls by national parliaments, and opening of channels of access for social movement organizations (della Porta 2005; Grimson and Pereyra 2008).

## **Conclusion**

Social movements have long been omitted from analysis of democratization. Modernization approaches have given little attention to agency (in general) and social movements in particular, focusing on the economic conditions for democratic stability. Scholars taking other approaches have studied the social classes that led democratization processes, focusing, however, more on their structural conditions than their mobilization. The dynamic study of democratization in so-called transitology considers social movements to be short-lived relevant actors in only the liberalization stage, focusing research on the institutional actors

especially when addressing transition and consolidation. Even though some authors mention a robust civil society as facilitating democratization processes, transitologists have traditionally paid little empirical attention to its characteristics and development. Social movement studies until recently have tended to focus on advanced democracies, remaining broadly unconcerned about social movements in authoritarian regimes and social movements in processes of democratization.

This lack of reciprocal attention is all the more concerning because protest cycles and waves of strikes are important in democratization processes, in both the forms of eventful democratization, driven by protest, and participatory pacts, in which civil society organizations invest their resources on the negotiation table (della Porta 2014). Emerging research shows that social movements tend to vary in the different stages of democratization:

1. Underground networks of resistance undermine internal and international supports for authoritarian regimes.
2. The intensity of the protest might accelerate processes of liberalization.
3. Social movements are often important allies of political parties and other collective actors in prodemocracy coalitions during the transition phase.
4. During and after democratic consolidation, alternative praxes of democracy within social movements might promote a procedural and/or substantive expansion of democracy.

Though movements have promoted democracy, they have not always been effective. Several factors are necessary for effective democratization to take place. One is the need for a combination of perspectives from above and from below, because “the ‘mode of transition,’ the context of the democratization process, the types of actors involved in the process, and their strategic interactions, all influence the kind of democracy that is established” (Pagnucco 1995: 151). Elements that favor democratization include a nonsyndical strike wave or a prodemocracy cycle of protest, increased political organization in urban areas and a relatively dense resistance network, a church that is actively involved in the struggle for democratization, international pressure from human rights advocacy networks, divisions within the elites concerning whether to continue the nondemocratic regime, and the existence of prodemocratic elites able to integrate the demands for democracy coming from below (at least until transition is well initiated). Difficulties emerge when the transition must deal with contending movements demanding national independence and alternative exclusionary views or when terrorist attacks or guerrilla movements develop during the democratization process rejecting democracy as a plausible immediate outcome. These two elements do not make democratization impossible but may put it at risk of never consolidating or of bringing only limited liberalization of authoritarianism.

## NOTES

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1. Democracy, despite breaks and irregularities, has in general been correlated with decreasing poverty and inequality (Przeworski et al. 2000; Houle 2009).

2. For comparison of gross domestic product and Gini index (when available) for these countries in the years of the transitions to democracy, we consulted the World Bank’s database at <http://data.worldbank.org>.

3. According to Huntington, “In a praetorian society groups become mobilized into politics without becoming socialized by politics” (1965: 83). This “politicization of social forces” (195) has several implications; the author emphasizes one: “The stability of a praetorian society varies inversely with the scope of political participation” (198).

4. Moore stresses in particular the presence of an urban bourgeoisie that is not allied with the aristocracy in repressing the emerging working class, allowing the latter to expand its claims.

5. On the working class and unions in democratization processes, see also Silver 2003.

6. Collier (1999) develops a dynamic analysis of democratization processes but concentrates her analysis in the working class (i.e., unions and labor or left-wing parties) with the intention of finding empirical answers to Moore’s puzzle.

7. A. Przeworski (1991: 57), for example, considers movements important in the creation of the conditions for liberalization, but they are a tool of an elite-led process.

8. For nondemocratic movements in Latin America, see Payne 2000; for Western Europe, see Klendermans and Mayer 2005.

9. In Orthodox countries, like Romania, the churches played different roles. The majoritarian Romanian Orthodox Church was co-opted by the regime, and the 2,500 buildings of the Greek Orthodox Church were expropriated and all the assets given to the Romanian Orthodox Church. The smaller Hungarian Reformed Church was crucial in the first phase of the transition to democracy (Siani-Davies 2005: chap. 5; Deletant 2006).

10. For a comparison of the role played by resistance movements and state repression in the struggles for democratization in the authoritarian regimes of Ne Win (1958–1981) in Burma (Myanmar), Ferdinand Marcos (1965–1986) in the Philippines, and Thojib (Raden) Suharto (1967–1998) in Indonesia, see Boudreau 2004.

11. Chapter 5 analyzes expansion of democracy in Bolivia following accession to power of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS; Movement toward Socialism).

12. Pearce 2010 offers several interesting examples of city-level experiments of direct democracy in Brazil, Colombia, Great Britain, and Venezuela. For the case of the assemblies movement of Buenos Aires, see Rossi 2005b.

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